Neither of the laws define personal data. 9 The personal data principles in the OECD guideline. "OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data -OECD," accessed May 26, 2016, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofperso naldata.htm#theproblems. 10 David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us To Choose Between Privacy And Freedom? (Basic Books, 1999) . Brin mentions in his book that technology will bring towards a transparent society. Here we argue that only the powerless individuals have become transparent but the state and commercial conglomerates have remained opaque. 11 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Datahttp://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofp ersonaldata.htm. existing legislation and proposed regulations require substantial revisions to mitigate the impacts of the SCS on data privacy and other interests critical to individual citizens.
The article begins by mapping out the background to the construction of China's big data social laboratory and the SCS. Section 1 examines the system's social management aim and comprehensive sanction system, as well as its nature as a collaborative project between the authorities and the business sector. Section 2 then summarises the legislative history and evolving concept of social credit and analyses the nature of individuals' rights to personal data protection under China's uncoordinated legal framework. The third section of the article reviews local social credit legislation with reference to the three cardinal principles of personal data protection most closely related to data subjects' control over the processing of their data: (1) the data collection principle, 12 (2) the data usage principle, 13 and (3) data subjects' right to access and correct their own data. 14 The final section concludes that although local legislation provides nominal rights of access to and a few restrictions on the collection and use of data, it has largely failed to secure meaningful control over personal data for individuals. These legislative defects relate to the very purpose of the SCS and to extra-legal restrictions inherited from the pre-reform party-state regime. As the term 'personal information' is used in Chinese legislative enactments and policy documents, 'data' and 'information' are used interchangeably throughout the article.
Since 2011, CCP directives and central government policies have used 'social credit' as a comprehensive concept that is closely related to both market regulation and social 15 SCS Outline, supra note 3, Introduction. 16 Ibid, Parts I & II; see also Michelle Florcruz, "China To Use Big Data To Rate Citizens In New 'Social Credit System,'" International Business Times, April 28, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/chinause-big-data-rate-citizens-new-social-credit-system-1898711. 17 SCS Outline, supra note 3, Introduction, para. 3. 18 For the evolution of the understanding of social credit in national policies, see Lei and other scholars object confounding the "social credit system (understood by them as essentially a financial credit system) with the "social trustworthiness system" (社会诚信体系). Nevertheless, "social credit system" is now predominantly used in both official and academic discourses to denote the comprehensive networked system of behaviour rating and responsibility placing.
governance. 20 In addition, governments at the local level have harboured the idea of building a multidimensional social credit system to restore trust in society. 21 In 2010, Suining County in Jiangsu Province (north of Shanghai) launched a pilot programme that awarded points for good behaviour and deducted points for bad behaviour such as traffic violations and illegally petitioning the higher authorities for help. 22 Rewards included the fast-tracking of promotions at work or of public housing applications.
Although the programme was heavily criticised, 23 it provided an early glimpse of a social scoring system. Another attempt at a social credit system was made by the Shanghai municipal government, which published a catalogue of more than 1200
items that would be awarded points for entry into a credit system. 24 About 1000 of the items related to business entities, with the remainder concerning individual citizens.
In 2016, the Shanghai government suggested that filial piety be entered into the scoring system, assessed, for example, by the frequency with which an individual visited his or her parents and by whether an individual's parents had enough food. registration system that records the users of telecommunications services in China, 31 and such data can be easily and accurately matched with users' identities.
Partnerships
The authorities are partnering with various Internet titans and private entities to unlock the power of big data. As early as 2014, China boasted more than 50% of the world's big data enterprises 32 specialising in the collection, aggregation, analysis and mining of data, the building of cross-platform infrastructure, and the design of various big data applications. 33 In 2013, China's National Bureau of Statistics signed a series of agreements with 11 major Chinese companies for long-term collaboration on the use of big data, 34 including Baidu, Alibaba and China Unicom. 35 The country's three
Internet giants have all tapped into the big data market. Baidu, the Chinese equivalent of Google's search engine, for example, operates its own Big Data Lab in Beijing, 36 which has developed predictive programmes for disease monitoring. 37 Alibaba, China's largest e-commerce company, makes use of a wealth of financial information gleaned from its Taobao and Alipay programmes to determine which businesses are worthy of loans. 38 Tencent, the tech mobile giant that runs WeChat, is using social data to identify the trendsetters within social groups to target them in marketing so as to influence the spending habits of the other members of those groups. 39 What is potentially worrying is that these companies share data with the government for the SCS. Chinese consumers using social networking and computer gaming data. 42 Beyond the lending and borrowing arena, Alibaba introduced Sesame Credit in 2015 as an internal rating system based on the spending habits of Alipay users. 43 Credit scores range from 350 to 950 points, with users scoring above 600 considered to be creditworthy. 44 What is worrying is that individuals' credit scores are based not only on their own lending and spending habits but also on what the money in question is going towards and also on the lending and spending habits of their friends. 45 Although it is unclear whether the Sesame Credit scoring system accurately predicts credit defaults, the system's impact is clearly being felt in the daily lives of Chinese trustworthiness that is generated or collected by the authorities in the course of exercising their public powers (i.e. government agencies, judicial authorities, organs that exercise administrative power under the authorisation of laws and regulations) or by public service providers. PCI is thus distinct from FCI, which is processed by credit investigation bodies, and is in essence equivalent to 'social credit information' referred to in the SCS Outline. This article uses PCI to refer to credit information regulated by local enactments.
After promulgation of the national SCS Outline, local legislation accelerated in the developed coastal cities of China. Most focuses on elaborating the categories of PCI subject to sharing amongst government agencies and the purposes for which such information can be used, as well as the rights of 'information subjects' to processed information. 65 The following sections of the article review typical examples of local legislation enacted since 2014.
COLLECTION OF CREDIT DATA
Local legislation invariably allows the extensive collection and use of PCI, a situation that derives from the holistic approach adopted by the SCS to curtail serve the general purpose of credit-based decision-making, that purpose is highly malleable and may differ from the purposes for which those records were originally generated by a particular government department or collected from a particular entity of an industry or a sector. As revealed by the analysis below, purpose limitation as an essential component of data protection is largely ineffective under the policy documents and local legislation on social credit.
SCS operation begins with the collection of social credit records by the agencies in charge of social credit ('SC authorities' hereafter). The major form of collection is transferring the records that are generated by various responsible agencies to dedicated information systems at given levels ('PCI platforms' hereafter). The scope and categories of the collected records, a considerable portion of which is personal information, 66 are determined by local governments rather than local legislatures, primarily by SC authorities. 67 Following the RACII approach, local PCI legislation forbids the collection of certain sensitive personal information, including genetic data, 66 Another part of information is records concerning enterprises which are regulated by a special system of enterprise. 67 The reform and development department, one of the most powerful government branches, is usually designated as the SC authority at local levels. See Wuxi Regulation, Wuhan Rules, and Hangzhou Rules. Hubei Regulation requires the provincial government to approve the collection scope.
blood types, fingerprints, and information on diseases and religious beliefs. 68 Unlike the collection of FCI under RACII, however, government agencies do not need to obtain the consent of data subjects to collect PCI, nor do they need to satisfy any purpose limitation rule. 69 In addition, most local legislation does not vest individuals with the right to be notified about the transfer of discrediting records from agencies to PCI platforms.
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Under current local legislation, PCI generally consists of two major categories:
(1) identity information on individuals, e.g. ID numbers or social security registration, and (2) credit records generated or acquired by government agencies in the exercise of their administrative powers or in the course of providing public services. 71 Credit records encompass both positive assessments received by an individual (e.g. recognition and rewards) and 'discrediting information', e.g. information on the violation of or failure to comply with legal, contractual or even ethical requirements.
The common types of misbehaviour logged in discrediting information correspond to those prescribed under the SCS Outline, including tax evasion, the non-payment of administrative fees, failure to perform the obligations prescribed in court judgments, being subject to administrative penalties or coercive measures, being held liable for accidents that affect public, food or work safety or environmental protection, being prohibited by the regulatory authorities from entering certain industries, and fraud in business transactions, state-held exams or social security applications. Disruptive 68 Cf. Art. 14, RACII. 69 Article 13 of the RACII stipulate that collection of personal information should obtain the consent of the subject of the information, unless for information which should be disclosed pursuant to or administrative regulations. 70 The only exception is the most recent Hubei Regulation. See Art. 23. The same article provides nevertheless that laws and other regulations can mandate the transfer without notifying the information subjects. In contrast, Article 15 of the RACII stipulates that provision of bad [financial] credit information about an individual to a credit investigation institution should be conducted only after the individual concerned is informed, except for information that is disclosed pursuant to laws and regulations. 71 These two categories are common to all local legislation and normative documents on SCI reviewed in this article.
behaviour in the course of using public services is also included. Such behaviour common in China includes ticket evasion on public transport and disturbances in hospitals by patients dissatisfied with medical treatment.
In addition to agency-submitted records, the SC authorities in some regions are allowed to gather records from non-state credit service providers, industry associations or the media. 72 They may also receive discrediting information on individuals from members of the public after confirmation with both the individuals concerned and the agency with jurisdiction over the activity in question. The SC authorities may then record that information in the PCI platforms. 73 Compared with the credit records generated by government agencies following statutory procedures, those generated by other parties may be of questionable reliability. Possibly because of this concern, the most recent PCI legislation, Hubei Provincial Social Credit Information, imposes an obligation to seek consent for the collection of credit records from non-state organisations, 74 although other legislation lacks any such obligation.
The earlier experience of Shanghai demonstrated that the mere mention of a consent obligation in legislation fails to ensure that consent is indeed sought before the government extends PCI collection to any records it sees fit. 10 (1) ). In particular, "information resources concerning the same theme of economic and social development and generated by various agencies together" should be shared inter-departmentally through the sharing platforms at different levels. Credit information is a highlighted example of such resources. (Art.10 (3)).
standards for PCI collection, categorisation, and sharing and of enhancing the interconnection and interoperability of PCI platforms across the country. 79 In addition, a comprehensive credit information sharing system is under construction on the basis of the national data exchange platform, which by December 2016 had aggregated PCI submitted by 37 departments of the State Council and government agencies from 31
provincial-level regions. 80 It is expected that in the near future most government agencies will be allowed to access all PCI generated or acquired by their counterparts across the country.
Furthermore, government agencies are required to request and use PCI under prescribed circumstances, most of which relate to the joint punishment or reward scheme. The scheme mainly covers the exercise of regulatory powers (such as licensing and punishment), government procurement, the granting of financial subsidies and the management of civil servants. 81 The scope of 'mandatory PCI use' is determined by local governments or their agencies. 82 Those agencies are thus allowed, and even encouraged, to perform the automatic matching of the personal information contained in various PCI databases for any purpose related to the exercise of their administrative powers.
As in the case of PCI collection, local legislation does not confer individuals with the right to object to the inter-agency sharing of PCI, and neither does it provide whereas some permits the SC authorities to define the scope of PCI subject to proactive disclosure. 104 The Hubei Regulation even provides that all PCI should be published unless laws and regulations prescribe otherwise. 105 These divergent approaches reflect the uncertain attitudes amongst agencies towards government transparency.
Open PCI is governed primarily by the 2007 ROGI, which requires government agencies to proactively disclose information that 'involves the vital interests of citizens or organizations' or matters 'that need to be extensively known or participated in by the general public'. 106 ROGI generally exempts information concerning privacy from disclosure, but allows agencies to release such information if they consider that non-disclosure would exert a major negative impact on the public interest. 107 Great discretion is thus vested in government agencies. Research shows that local agencies tend to deny activists' access to administrative penalty decisions despite the fact that the disclosure of anonymised decisions would enable the public to monitor the exercise of administrative power. 108 In the SCS context, however, the central authorities have undergone a remarkable attitudinal shift, actively mandating the publication of administrative penalty decisions that name the individuals being penalised. 109 That shift is associated with the SCS policy to expose what is considered to be 'serious discrediting behaviour'.
A similar extensive list of serious discrediting behaviour is provided in all local
legislation. Yet the disclosure of such behaviours does not serve the same purpose.
Some of the enumerated behaviours indeed involve the vital interests of citizens, as referred to in ROGI, such as 'activities severely endangering the health and safety of the public' in the areas of food and drug safety, environmental protection, not directly affect livelihoods, but their disclosure is considered essential for some compelling public interest. For instance, the public naming of judgement defaulters is acknowledged to be necessary for inhibiting the prevalent circumvention of obligations imposed by effective judicial rulings. 111 There is another sweeping category of behaviour whose disclosure serves obscure interests, that is, 'deliberative refusals to perform legal obligations and hence seriously jeopardizing the credibility of judicial authorities and administrative authorities'. 112 All evasions of administrative penalty decisions fall within this category. Their indiscriminate disclosure raises concerns about disproportionality and fairness. Substantial differences exist in the social impacts of such behaviour, as well as in individuals' faults in engaging in it.
Subjecting individuals punished on various grounds to the same level of exposure does not correspond to the gravity of their contraventions, nor to the normal understanding of 'serious' discrediting behaviour. The correctness or appropriateness of administrative penalties also varies. Administrative decisions may be reached in accordance with government-issued rules that are not necessarily consistent with the law. Such decisions are inferior to judicial rulings in terms of the openness and fairness of the decision-making process, impartiality of the decision-maker and rigorousness of the evidential rules. They are also not necessarily final or legally binding because their legality can be reviewed by the courts. Accordingly, public trust in administrative decisions is weaker than public trust in judgements.
It is doubtful whether the indiscriminate publication of 'serious discrediting records', those on administrative penalty decisions in particular, creates positive incentives for 'keeping faith' or being 'sincere citizens'. It does, however, raise privacy concerns. For example, it enables the profiling of an individual based exclusively on sanctions imposed upon him or her by the government, information on which used to be scattered and not readily accessible. Legislative attempts to make such publication mandatory have indeed been criticised by some mainland lawyers.
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According to these critics, citizens' privacy rights are inevitably compromised by the publication of certain contraventions occurring in the private domain, including, for example, the concealment of disease in contraction of marriage or of infidelity to a spouse. 114 Such criticism is broadly consistent with the rationale for introducing privacy exceptions to public trials and the publication of judgments. All three Chinese laws governing litigation proceedings exempt cases concerning privacy from open trial. 115 The Supreme People's Court (SPC) also forbids the online publication of 'information concerning privacy' in rulings on familial disputes and personality rights and that of the full names of parties to marriage and succession cases. 116 In this regard, secrecy in at least some part of family life is protected by the law. However, there is no Chinese legislation defining the content of the right to privacy. According to dominant civil law doctrine, as an element of the right to privacy, 'private information protected from disclosure' refers to information that is irrelevant to the public interest or to the interests of other persons. 117 The implication is that information on a violation of the law may not amount to 'private information' if that violation implicates the public interest. 118 Furthermore, civil law doctrine does not cover the right to privacy against the intrusion of public authorities. In this regard, the scope of privacy is far from clear in the public law context, and is hardly an operable defence for citizens looking to restrict the proactive release of PCI by the government.
The only restriction on such disclosure imposed by local legislation is the setting of an expiry date for access to all discrediting records: five years after commission of the recorded behaviour 119 or five years after generation of the record 120 unless otherwise prescribed by the state. Expired records are to be neither disclosed nor used.
Although this 'sunset clause' to the accessibility of PCI arguably reduces the perpetuation of negative track records, it affords data subjects no role in, let alone any control over, the selection of PCI for disclosure. Furthermore, no local legislation has ever sought to regulate the reuse of disclosed PCI by third parties, a perilous omission given the strong possibility of an individual's discreditable past being exploited to his deliberating on a draft regulation which explicitly provides for the right to both access and rectification. 126 The disparity in the legal enforcement of PCI policies in different regions not only causes unfairness in data protection, but also weakens the accuracy of a data system that purports to overcome jurisdictional limits on the flow of data.
Limits Imposed by Personal Archive Regime
It is noteworthy that the national regulation on freedom of information (FOI) have bearing on information rights related to PCI, which also constitutes government information. ROGI, which entered into effect in 2008, creates a general right to request the disclosure of information held by government agencies, subject to certain exemptions. 127 In the absence of specific legislation on personal information protection, ROGI further confers a specific right on the subjects of government-held personal information. 139 Such personal information is thus necessarily of a political nature and deserving of secrecy. 140 For the same reason, the imperative to withhold personal archives from their subjects extends to the archives on non-cadres working in state or sector. 142 All these rules that were issued jointly by the CCP and the state organs sustain a party-state regime that governs the most important types of personal information and one-sidedly stresses the utility of such information to the ruling party.
The unfortunate reality, as confirmed by the courts in a variety of FOI cases, is that the party-state regime overrides national legislation that purports to protect data subjects' access right and safeguard individuals' intermediate interests.
The dominance of the personal archive regime may extend from the FOI context to the SCS. There is similarity between personal archives and social credit records:
both include appraisals of individuals' performance of their societal roles, particularly their compliance with state-sanctioned rules. In fact, the SCS Outline calls for the establishment of 'integrity archives' for various focal groups, such as civil servants, members of the judiciary, experts and agents working in the statistics, advertising and environmental impact assessment sectors, and the creation of 'credit archives' for all citizens in relation to certain types of behaviour, such as online activities and violations of traffic codes. 143 The personal information contained in the aforementioned integrity archives may well fall within the ambit of 'personal archives'. In particular, the General Office of the State Council advocates for the compilation of student honesty archives by universities to include records on academic cheating, failure to repay loans and the falsification of materials for job applications. 144 Such records overlap in full with what is collected in the personal archives of university students under the Cadre Archives Regulation. More importantly, part of the rationale for the SCS, i.e. the need to select individuals who satisfy certain state-approved standards, fits precisely with the political functions of the personal archive regime. Although it is unclear whether the SCS will operate independently from the personal archive regime, we should not ignore the impacts of the party-state's secrecy imperatives on the officials who design and operate the SCS, which is refreshed system of citizen profiling. Even if more localities adopt legislation that recognises the subject access right, the subordination of that legislation to CCP rules may reoccur in practice.
Given the weak legal force of most local PCI legislation and the extra-legal restraints on ROGI, the protection of access and correction rights in relation to PCI is at a rather primitive stage, although the initiatives undertaken by local pilot schemes are broadly consistent with the regulatory trends of big data profiling in some pioneering jurisdictions such the EU and US.
CONCLUSION
Law-making on public credit information at the local level is the first step taken by the Chinese state to standardize the practices in constructing the ambitious Social Credit System. It deserves close examination for those who are concerned with the privacy impact and other profound implications of the SCS, a big data-empowered system that is potentially capable of tracking and profiling each individual and rating him or her according to state-imposed criteria with legal and social consequences.
Distinct from the regimes common to most jurisdictions that regulate private bodies'
handling of financial credit data, PCI legislation focuses on government agencies and adopts a highly fluid concept of credit data. In the absence of general legal framework for personal data protection, it is such legislation that sets the basic albeit interim rules for the "jungle of big credit data".
However, PCI legislation largely fails to live up to the tenets of personal data protection, as demonstrated by the foregoing analysis in this paper. This regulatory approach gives virtually free rein to secondary use of and big data analytics concerning records on misbehaviours, including those records that many individuals regard as sensitive and should be kept private. Automatic matching of credit data databases and profiling about individuals are hence permissible, entailing threats to a series of privacy-related interests including rehabilitation, personal autonomy, and non-discrimination.
From a legal perspective, the existing Chinese legislation at both national and local levels does not effectively prevent the party-state from expanding and intensifying its control over each citizen by generating, aggregating and exploiting personal data on their social behaviours. While law-making concerning the SCS may evolve, the party-state's governance strategy is one of the most important factors to consider when we try to understand the effectiveness of legislation in mitigating the privacy impacts of the SCS. A natural response to the flaws of current PCI legislation is to call for substantial revision of existing provisions and making of new and, ideally, national law which incorporate the cardinal principles of data protection. For instance, the public may demand the law to explicitly grant data subjects' with a right to access and correct their credit data, and a right to object to access and use of credit data by third parties. However, if the SCS develops truly according to the blueprint prescribed by the SCS Outline and Big Data Outline, there may be growing gaps between the system and wishful suggestions on legal reform towards more stringent protection of personal data. Throughout the construction of the SCS, tension persists between the
